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Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	propose	that	just	15%	of	people,	or	even	fewer,	are	susceptible	to	 false	 childhood	memories.	 If	 this	 figure	were	 true,	 then	 false	memories	would	 still	 be	 a	serious	problem.	But	 the	 figure	 is	higher	 than	15%.	False	memories	occur	even	after	 a	 few	short	and	 low-pressure	 interviews,	 and	with	each	 successive	 interview	 they	become	richer,	more	 compelling,	 and	more	 likely	 to	 occur.	 It	 is	 therefore	 dangerously	misleading	 to	 claim	that	the	scientific	data	provide	an	“upper	bound”	on	susceptibility	to	memory	errors.	We	also	raise	concerns	about	the	peer	review	process.					
  
  
Misrepresentations	and	flawed	logic	about	the	prevalence	of	false	memories 		Decades	of	research	shows	that	people	can	come	to	remember	events	that	never	happened.	In	fact,	as	scientists	who	conduct	this	kind	of	research,	we	know	it’s	not	all	that	difficult	to	“implant”	false	memories.	Many	participants	in	our	experiments	remember	a	wide	range	of	experiences	that	just	weren't	so.	It	is	puzzling,	therefore,	that	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	say	it	is	hard	to	implant	false	memories,	that	false	memories	are	rare,	and	that	false	memory	rates	are	overstated.	If	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	want	to	make	broad,	sweeping	conclusions	about	this	literature,	then	they	should	have	obtained	the	original	data	from	as	many	researchers	as	possible,	combined	those	data,	and	recoded	them.	They	could	have	done	exactly	that—after	all,	they	contacted	several	researchers	for	information	in	the	course	of	writing	their	paper.		But	thankfully,	others	have	already	undertaken	this	task.	Wade,	Scoboria,	and	Lindsay	(2015)	recently	conducted	a	mega-analysis	in	which	they	combined	and	recoded	the	data	from	eight	published	memory	implantation	studies.	They	found	that,	overall,	22%	of	subjects	reported	either	“complete”	or	“substantial”	false	memories,	and	a	further	9%	reported	“partial”	false	memories.	Put	another	way,	nearly	a	third	of	people	came	to	remember	something	about	an	event	that	never	happened.	The	fact	that	more	than	a	fifth	of	people	in	Scoboria	et	al.’s	analysis,	or	15%	in	Brewin	and	Andrews’	analysis,	developed	rich	false	memories	packed	with	perceptual	detail	is	somewhat	astounding	given	that	some	of	these	memories	were	elicited	under	experimental	conditions	designed	to	produce	low	false-memory	rates	(for	example,	Ost,	Foster,	Costall,	&	Bull,	2005,	and	the	control	conditions	in	studies	such	as	Desjardins	&	Scoboria,	2007,	and	Hyman	&	Pentland,	1996).	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	also	complain	that	almost	no	one	in	an	imagination	inflation	study	experiences	false	memories.	But	the	aim	of	imagination	inflation	research	is	not	usually	to	create	false	memories.	Instead,	it	is	to	investigate	the	ways	in	which	imagining	
  
counterfactual	childhood	events	can	inflate	people's	confidence	that	those	events	were	real.	In	fact,	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	themselves	admit	that	this	work	is	“by	and	large	only	intended	to	assess	autobiographical	belief”	(p.17).		Now,	perhaps	at	this	point,	a	critic	might	charge	that	the	literature	we	have	just	presented	confirms	that	most	people	are	not	susceptible	to	the	influences	that	create	false	memories	or	false	beliefs.	That	is	essentially	what	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	themselves	have	said.	But	such	a	claim	fundamentally	misrepresents	scientific	understanding.	After	all,	let	us	consider	the	differences	between	laboratory	paradigms	and	the	real-world	situations	they	parallel.	When	we	conduct	these	memory	implantation	studies,	we	do	not	pair	an	authoritative	therapist	with	a	vulnerable	client.	We	are	not	spending	weeks	and	weeks	suggesting	to	a	vulnerable	client—who	is	searching	for	reasons	for	her	current	problems	—that	she	has	buried	childhood	trauma	in	some	dark	corner	of	her	memory.	Instead,	we	pair	a	twenty-something	year-old	graduate	student	with	a	volunteer.	They	meet	a	few	times	over	the	course	of	a	week	or	two,	while	the	grad	student	encourages	the	volunteer	to	try	and	remember	something	that	didn’t	happen.	The	fact	that	such	a	weak	analog	of	dubious	recovered-memory	techniques	produces	false	memories	at	any	rate,	let	alone	in	a	sizable	minority,	is	astonishing.		Moreover,	study	after	study	shows	that	what	begins	merely	as	a	subject’s	willingness	to	entertain	a	suggestion	often	develops	over	the	course	of	the	study	into	a	richer	and	compelling	recollection.	People’s	ratings	of	the	characteristics	of	their	own	memories	also	increase	in	parallel	with	independent	judges’	ratings.	We	can	ponder	for	a	moment	what	would	happen	as	the	number	of	sessions	increased	to	approximate	the	number	of	times	someone	would	see	a	therapist.	The	smart	money	is	on	the	prediction	that	the	rate	of	false	memories	and	the	strength	of	self-report	ratings	would	increase.		It’s	clear	there	are	copious	reasons	to	predict	that	the	rates	of	false	memory	reported	in	these	studies	do	not	represent	an	upper	bound	on	people’s	susceptibility	to	suggestion.	But	
  
let	us	stop	to	consider	the	counterfactual	for	a	moment.	What	if	Brewin	and	Andrews	were	right?	What	would	it	mean	if	only	15%	of	people,	or	even	fewer,	were	susceptible	to	wholly	false	memories?	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	repeatedly	imply	that	because	false	memories	(apparently)	occur	in	only	a	tiny	fraction	of	people,	scientists	are	making	a	mountain	out	of	a	molehill.	But	let's	look	at	this	finding	another	way.	If	there	were	a	drug	on	the	market	that	produced	“adverse	events”	at	even	the	low,	incorrect	rate	the	authors	suggest,	it	would	be	taken	off	the	market	in	a	flash.	But	let's	stay	in	the	realm	of	psychology.	Suppose	a	clinical	disorder	occurred	in	15%	of	the	general	population.	We	would	consider	that	disorder	to	be	highly	prevalent.	Would	Brewin	and	Andrews?	Given	their	longstanding	interest	in	trauma,	let’s	consider	a	concrete	example,	such	as	PTSD.	The	lifetime	prevalence	of	PTSD	among	adult	Americans	is	estimated	at	6.8%.	That’s	less	than	half	of	the	incorrect	rate	of	false	memories	that	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	estimate—but	they	quite	rightfully	do	not	relegate	PTSD	to	molehill	status.	How	about	other	serious	psychological	disorders?	Many	serious	psychological	disorders	have	a	prevalence	of	under	3%,	and	some	even	less	than	1%.	But	if	1	person	in	100	has	a	disorder	that	seriously	affects	the	quality	of	their	life	and	ability	to	function,	that	is	a	huge	number	in	absolute	terms	at	the	level	of	the	population.	So	even	if	15%	were	a	correct	figure,	it	is	still	hard	to	understand	how	Brewin	and	Andrews	could	marshal	an	argument	that	15%	is	not	worth	worrying	about.	Brewin	and	Andrews	(2016)	also	take	to	task	scholars	who—in	their	writings	and	expert	testimony—talk	about	the	fallibility	of	memory.	But	these	scholars	know	a	lot	more	about	memory	fallibility	than	just	the	three	paradigms	that	Brewin	and	Andrews	dissect.	For	instance,	memory	scholars	know	about	self-enhancing	memory	distortions,	such	as	Bahrick,	Hall,	and	Berger’s	(1996)	famous	work	showing	that	people	remember	their	school	grades	as	better	than	they	actually	were.	They	know	about	studies	of	people	who	came	to	remember	they	were	abused,	but	later	realized	their	memories	were	false	(Lief	&	Fetkewicz,	1995;	De	
  
Rivera,	2000).	These	scholars	know	about	research	with	subjects	who	remember	being	abducted	by	aliens,	for	whom	these	memories	feel	entirely	real	(McNally	et	al.,	2004).	These	scholars	also	know	the	many	studies	of	misinformation	showing	that	people’s	memories	are	easily	and	quickly	distorted	(see	Schacter	&	Loftus,	2013,	for	a	review).	In	short,	scholarly	opinions	about	the	fragility	of	memory	derive	from	many	different	types	of	studies	that	go	far	beyond	what	Brewin	and	Andrews	reviewed.	Considered	as	a	whole,	Brewin	and	Andrews’	(2016)	paper	ignores	the	facts	so	blithely	that	it	seems	more	suited	to	being	called	an	Op-Ed	piece	than	a	peer	reviewed	“Research	Article.”	Maybe	that’s	because	it	probably	was	not	peer	reviewed.	We	asked	both	the	Founding	Editor	and	the	Editor	who	invited	our	commentary	whether	Brewin	and	Andrews’	paper	had	been	sent	out	for	peer	review.	They	did	not	answer.	We	also	contacted	21	false-memory	experts	whom	Brewin	and	Andrews	cited,	and	we	asked	these	experts	if	they	would	be	willing	to	confirm	that—just	like	the	five	of	us—they	did	not	review	the	original	submission	for	ACP.	Each	of	them	answered:	none	of	them	had	reviewed	it.	These	data	fit	with	other	data	on	the	interval	between	when	Brewin	and	Andrews	first	submitted	this	paper	and	when	it	was	accepted.	A	close	look	at	the	publication	history	reveals	a	curiously	short	interval:	just	28	days,	which	apparently	included	sufficient	time	for	revisions	and	resubmission.	But	perhaps	such	as	short	turnaround	time	means	that	Applied	Cognitive	Psychology	has	recently	committed	itself	to	extremely	speedy	peer	review?	To	address	this	possibility,	we	examined	all	papers	appearing	in	the	first	three	2016	issues	of	ACP	that	were	designated	as	a	"Research	Article"	(like	Brewin	and	Andrews'	paper).	Among	these	39	papers,	the	mean	turnaround	was	282	days,	a	figure	more	than	ten	times	the	28	days	Brewin	and	Andrews	enjoyed.	The	median	turnaround	was	261	days,	with	a	range	of	101-699	days.	In	other	words,	even	the	paper	with	the	next	quickest	turnaround	still	took	nearly	four	times	as	long.	Of	course,	it	goes	without	saying	that	peer	review	is	crucial.	Because	of	that	fact,	scholarly	publishers	worldwide	have	embraced	the	Code	of	Conduct	put	forth	by	the	
  
worldwide	Committee	on	Publication	Ethics	(COPE).	More	than	900	journals	and	dozens	of	publishers	are	members,	who	choose	to	comply	with	the	COPE	Code,	and	its	Principles	of	Transparency	and	Best	Practice	in	Scholarly	Publishing.	The	very	first	Principle	says:	Peer	review	process:	Journal	content	must	be	clearly	marked	as	whether	peer	reviewed	or	not.	Peer	review	is	defined	as	obtaining	advice	on	individual	manuscripts	from	reviewers	expert	in	the	field	who	are	not	part	of	the	journal’s	editorial	staff.	This	process,	as	well	as	any	policies	related	to	the	journal’s	peer	review	procedures,	shall	be	clearly	described	on	the	journal’s	Web	site	(Committee	on	Publication	Ethics,	2014)		Some	of	our	science’s	best	publishing	houses	and	journals	refer	to	COPE.	For	example,	Elsevier	obliged	all	its	journals	(including	the	Journal	of	Applied	Research	in	Memory	&	Cognition)	to	follow	COPE	principles.	Wiley-Blackwell	has,	for	some	reason,	left	this	decision	to	each	journal.		As	a	result	of	that	decision,	what	are	we	commenting	on	now?	A	flawed	opinion	piece	masquerading	as	a	peer	reviewed	article.		
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